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Abstract
In [P. Hancock, A. Setzer, Interactive programs in dependent type theory, in: P. Clote, H. Schwichtenberg (Eds.), Proc. 14th
Annu. Conf. of EACSL, CSL’00, Fischbau, Germany, 21–26 August 2000, Vol. 1862, Springer, Berlin, 2000, pp. 317–331, URL
〈citeseer.ist.psu.edu/article/hancock00interactive.html〉; P. Hancock, A. Setzer, Interactive programs and weakly ﬁnal coalgebras
in dependent type theory, in: L. Crosilla, P. Schuster (Eds.), From Sets and Types to Topology and Analysis. Towards Practicable
Foundations for Constructive Mathematics, Oxford Logic Guides, Clarendon Press, 2005, URL 〈www.cs.swan.ac.uk/∼csetzer/〉]
Hancock and Setzer introduced rules to extend Martin-Löf’s type theory in order to represent interactive programming. The rules
essentially reﬂect the existence of weakly ﬁnal coalgebras for a general form of polynomial functor. The standard rules of dependent
type theory allow the deﬁnition of inductive types, which correspond to initial algebras. Coalgebraic types are not represented in
a direct way. In this article we show the existence of ﬁnal coalgebras in intensional type theory for these kind of functors, where
we require uniqueness of identity proofs (UIP) for the set of states S and the set of commands C which determine the functor. We
obtain the result by identifying programs which have essentially the same behaviour, viz. are bisimular. This proves the rules of
Setzer and Hancock admissible in ordinary type theory, if we replace deﬁnitional equality by bisimulation. All proofs [M. Michel-
brink, Veriﬁcations of ﬁnal coalgebra theorem in: Interfaces as Functors, Programs as Coalgebras—A Final Coalgebra Theorem in
Intensional Type Theory, 2005, URL 〈www.cs.swan.ac.uk/∼csmichel/〉] are veriﬁed in the theorem prover agda [C. Coquand, Agda,
Internet, URL 〈www.cs.chalmers.se/∼catarina/agda/〉; K. Peterson, A programming system for type theory, Technical Report, S-412
96, Chalmers University of Technology, Göteborg, 1982], which is based on intensional Martin-Löf type theory.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Martin-Löf type theory [28,35] is a very carefully developed framework for constructive mathematics. It is well
suited as a theory for program construction since it is possible to express both speciﬁcation and programs within the
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same formalism. Types in Martin-Löf type theory can be seen as program speciﬁcations via the proposition-as-types
interpretation [34,6,37]. Inhabitants of these types are programs which fulﬁl the required speciﬁcation. Running such a
program means to evaluate an expression. One of the design features of the framework is that the evaluation of a well-
typed program always terminates. Further, there is no interaction with the environment. In order to introduce interaction
into type theory and to allow the non-termination of programs, Hancock and Setzer [17,19] introduced the notions of
(state dependent) interfaces and interactive programs. Their approach results in an extension of type theory by rules
expressing the existence of weakly ﬁnal coalgebras for the functors determined by interfaces. This coalgebraic rules
give a comfortable way to reason about interactive programs. However, coalgebraic types are not represented directly in
standard type theory. In fact, they are classical examples of impredicative conceptions whereas Martin-Löf type theory
is a strictly predicative theory. Predicative type theories play a particular role for giving foundational interpretations of
programming languages. They have multiple mathematical models, notably set theoretic, PER models and denotational
models, that provide precise deﬁnitions of programming language features, due to their explicit inductive construction.
On the other side one has to be careful adding rules to type theory. That this may have disastrous consequences can
be seen e.g. in Martin-Löf’s Mathematics of Inﬁnity [29] where it is shown that type theory becomes inconsistent when
the formal laws for the ﬁxed point operator are adjoined to it.
However, in this work we show that it is possible to reason about interactive programs in standard predicative type
theory as long as we replace the deﬁnitional equality in the rules [17,19] by bisimulation. This is done by constructing
ﬁnal coalgebras for the functors mentioned above. The basic idea for this construction is essentially the same as for
the model construction in Michelbrink/Setzer [34]. However, the proof that there is a ﬁnal coalgebra for this kind of
functors is surprisingly hard. This is due to the fact that we work in intensional type theory, where we have to deal with
the problem that types depending on propositionally equal elements may not be equal. However, unlike the extensional
version intensional type theory has a number of desirable features we do not want to miss: all well-typed expressions
normalize and well-typedness, type-hood, type-checking as well as deﬁnitional equality are decidable.
The theory of types developed by Martin-Löf “is intended to be a full scale system for formalizing intuitionistic
mathematics” [30]. As a foundational theory it is thought to be open-ended, in the sense that we might extend it by
rules for new types provided the informal semantic principles of the theory are respected. In this article we work
with an extension of Martin-Löf type theory that accommodates inductive–recursive deﬁnitions. A ﬁrst example of
simultaneous induction–recursion is Martin-Löf’s deﬁnition of the ﬁrst universe á la Tarski [28]. The general schema
for this kind of deﬁnition is introduced and investigated by Dybjer [10].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we restate the original deﬁnition of interfaces and programs, try to
explain the concept of intensional identity, the meaning it has for constructive reasoning and describe the difﬁculties
which arise using this concept. We discuss families and predicates and how they are related and give a new modiﬁed
deﬁnition of interfaces. In Section 3 we introduce our category and in the following Section 4 the endofunctor Prog
on this category, for which we are going to show that there is a ﬁnal coalgebra in the category. In Section 5 we deﬁne
a coalgebra for this functor, which consist in a family of sets CT, equivalence relations on this sets and a morphism
elim: CT → Prog CT. In Section 6 we introduce the unique morphism. However, to prove that the function deﬁned
indeed belongs to the category and that it is the unique morphism making the coalgebra square commute we have to
do some more work. In Section 7 we deﬁne the repetition of the unique morphism and prove our Main Lemma. The
Main Lemma is then used to prove that the morphism deﬁned in Section 6 belongs to the category (is extensional) and
is the unique morphism making the diagram commute. In Section 8 we point out how to get a ﬁnal coalgebra for the
original functor of Hancock/Setzer from this. In Section 10 we conclude by describing some future and related work.
We use the following notations: t t ′ for t evaluates to t ′, t t ′ for t, t ′ evaluate to the same value, A for the
type A is inhabited, id : t .= t ′ or id : t .=A t ′ for id is an inhabitant of the identity type. We use the notation
(x : A) → B x for the product type and sig m0 : A0, . . . ,mn : An m0 . . .mn−1 for sigma types where the components
of a : sig m0 : A0, . . . ,mn : An m0 . . .mn−1 are accessed via ami for i = 0, . . . , n. We denote the canonical elements
of the sigma types by 〈a0, . . . , an〉 and abbreviate sig fst : A, snd : B fst by∑(A,B) or∑(x : A.B x) to emphasize
x. The sentential connectives ∀, ∃,∧,∨,⇒ for this type of constructors are used in the standard way to emphasize the
reading of types as propositions. We sometimes suppress arguments which can be inferred from other arguments, for
instance we write subst id b instead of subst A B a a′ id b. We also use the notation _ for missing arguments. We
use the notations False and True for the type with zero and one canonical element, respectively. To improve readability
we overload some function symbols, e.g. st, co. However, functions denoted by equal symbols have equal codomains
whereas the argument types may be different.
M. Michelbrink / Theoretical Computer Science 360 (2006) 415–439 417
2. Basic deﬁnitions and concepts
2.1. Interfaces and interactive programs
In [17] Hancock and Setzer give the following deﬁnition of an interface:
An interface is a quadruple (S, C,R, n) s.t.
• S : Set
• C : S → Set
• R : (s : S,C s) → Set
• n : (s : S, c : C s,R s c) → S.
The elements of the set S are called states, C s is the set of commands in state s : S, R s c the set of responses to a
command c : C s in state s : S, and n s c r the next state of the system after this interaction.
A program for this interface starting in state s : S is a quadruple (A, c, next, a) s.t.
• A : S → Set
• c : (s : S,A s) → C s
• next : (s : S, a : A s, r : R s (c s a)) → A (n s (c s a) r)
• a : A s.
The elements of the set A s are understood as programs starting in the state s. The command c s a is the command
issued by the program a : A s, and next s a r is the program that will be executed, after having obtained for command
c s a the response r : R s (c s a). The execution of a program a : A s proceeds as follows. First we compute c s a
and issue this command. Then we wait for a response r : R s (c s a) from the real world. When we have obtained
a response r we compute the new program next s a r . This cycle is repeated until we reach a command c with no
responses. It may be undecidable if this is the case. It should also be noted that a program may wait forever for a
response. See [17] for further motivations.
Note that in the above deﬁnition programs are given by arbitrary families of sets A : S → Set. That means the
whole range of sets can be used to introduce elements into the set of all programs. In particular, the set of programs
itself may be used. This is a violation of the vicious-circle principle: impredicative deﬁnitions should not be used. That
is, an object should not be deﬁned in terms of a totality to which the object itself belongs. In other words, no totality
can contain members deﬁned in terms of itself. The vicious-circle principle is taken very seriously in Martin-Löf type
theory.
If we combine c s a and next s a we get an element of ProgHS A s :=
∑
(c : C s.(r : R s c) → A (n s c r)).
Since there is no way to get the set of all programs directly in a predicative framework, Hancock and Setzer expanded
Martin-Löf type theory. This results in a type theory where the adjoined rules express the existence of a (weakly) ﬁnal
coalgebra for the functor ProgHS.
We are going to show that under certain assumptions on the sets of states and commands the existence of this set of
programs can be proved in ordinary type theory. The proof is surprisingly hard. The reason for this is that we work in
intensional type theory.
2.2. Intensional identity
Under the proposition-as-types interpretation, propositions are nothing other than types. That a proposition is true
means that the type is inhabited. In order to have an internal representation of equality, identity types are introduced.
The main purpose of these identity types is to be able to make the assumption that two objects of a type are identical,
i.e. to express identity of objects on the left side of an implication. Martin-Löf type theory can be formulated on top
of a theory of logical types (logical framework) [35]. This is a typed -calculus with dependent function types, a
special type Set and a rule which states that each object of Set is also a type. Sets are given by formation, introduction,
elimination and equality rules. The formation rules say how to build sets, the introduction rules say what the canonical
elements of the set are. Elimination and equality rules say how to eliminate set formers. - and -conversion together
with the equality rules give deﬁnitional equality.
There are two main versions of Martin-Löf type theory: extensional and intensional type theory. The difference lies
in the treatment of the identity type. In both versions the formation and introduction rules of the identity type are
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the same:
A : Set a, b : A
a
.=A b : Set
A : Set a : A
reﬂ a : a .=A a
The difference is in the elimination and equality rules for the identity type. The elimination rules in extensional type
theory identify propositional and deﬁnitional identity:
p : a .=A b
a = b : A
This renders type theory undecidable, i.e. well-typedness, type-checking, type-hood and deﬁnitional equality become
undecidable [22]. This is in contrast to intensional type theory. There is a deep symmetry between the introduction rules
on the one side and the elimination and equality rules on the other side in intensional type theory. The elimination rules
for all sets can be understood as structural induction rules: a proposition is true for all elements iff the proposition is
true for the canonical elements of the set. In fact, elimination and equality rules can be calculated from the introduction
rules [9]. This holds as well for the identity type:
C : (x, y : A,p : x .=A y) → Set
c : (x : A) → C x x (reﬂ x) a, b : A p : a .=A b
idpeel C c a b p : C a b p
with equality idpeel C c a a (reﬂ a) = c a. Surprisingly this very weak elimination rule allows to deduce the usual
properties of equality, notably Leibniz’ principle (C a implies C b for a .= b). However, working with intensional
identity becomes very awkward. The reason for this is that propositional and deﬁnitional equality do not collapse. That
is, two instances of a type family with indices which are not convertible, just propositionally equal, are not the same
type, i.e. c : C a is in general not an element of C b if a equals b, though if p : a .= b and c : C a we get an element
subst p c : C b. The trouble is that this element depends on the proof p and there is no general way to conclude that
subst p c equals subst q c for p, q : a .= b.
We frequently use the following well known (and easy to prove) principles:
Principle 1.
a0
.= a1 ⇒ f a0 .= f a1
for A,B : Set, f : A → B, a0, a1 : A.
Principle 2.
〈a0, b0〉 .=∑(A,B) 〈a1, b1〉 ⇔ a0 .=A a1 ∧ b¯0 .=B a1 b1
for A : Set, B : A → Set, ai : A, bi : Bi, i = 0, 1 and b¯0 obtained from b0 by the inhabitant of a0 .= a1.
2.3. Families and predicates
What makes type theory into dependent type theory is that types may depend on elements of other types. A family
of sets is given by a set IndexP and a function P : IndexP → Set. The function P may as well be seen as a predicate on
IndexP. On the other hand it is often technically simpler to work with a more ﬁbration-like view of families: a family
is given by two sets CoIndexF, IndexF and a function F : CoIndexF → IndexF. We call the former predicate and
the latter family. It is possible to switch between these notions in the following ways: from predicate P to family F
(pr0 denotes the ﬁrst projection):
CoIndexF :=∑(IndexP, P )
IndexF := IndexP
F := pr0 : ∑(IndexP, P ) → IndexP.
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From family F to predicate P deﬁne IndexP := IndexF and let P i be given by the following rules:
Formation Introduction Elimination
i : IndexF
P i : Set
c : CoIndexF
intro c : P (F c)
i : IndexF c′ : P i
B : (i : IndexF, c′ : P i) → Set
b : (c : CoIndexF) → B (F c) (intro c)
elim B b i c′ : B i c′
where elim B b (F c) (intro c) evaluates to b c. Note that the latter gives exactly the rules for intensional identity
if we take as family  : A → A × A with  a := (a, a). We write PredToFam P and FamToPred F , respectively,
for the predicate and family we gain by the way above. Intuitively we can think about FamToPred F as the pre-image
function F−1.
We say that f : A → B is a bijection iff there is a g : B → A such that a .= (g(f a)) and b .= (f (g b)) are inhabited
for all a : A, b : B. We write A  B iff there is such a bijection. It is easy to establish the following bijections:
P i  FamToPred (PredToFam P) i
iso : CoIndexF  (PredToFam(FamToPred F))CoIndexF.
In the second case the functions pr0 ◦ iso = (PredToFam(FamToPred F)) ◦ iso and F are pointwise equal.
There is a second approach to get a predicate P from a family F. This approach uses the identity set: deﬁne IndexP :=
IndexF and
P i := ∑(c : CoIndexF, (F c) .= i)
for i : IndexF. We write FamToPred′ F for this predicate. Again it is not too hard to establish the following bijections:
P i  FamToPred′ (PredToFam P) i
iso : CoIndexF  (PredToFam (FamToPred′ F))CoIndexF
and to prove that in the second case the functions pr0 ◦ iso = (PredToFam (FamToPred′ F)) ◦ iso and F are pointwise
equal. Note that the index set stays the same all the time and that
FamToPred (PredToFam P) i  FamToPred′ (PredToFam P) i
(PredToFam (FamToPredF))CoIndex  (PredToFam (FamToPred′ F))CoIndexF.
This is a little bit remarkable since the second approach seems to multiply elements due to the fact that there may be
more than one inhabitant of (F c) .= i. The phenomenon is related to the fact that we can prove
Collapse
∑
(a : A, a .= a′)
for a′ : A but in general not
Collapse (a .= a′)
for a, a′ : A where Collapse A is ∀a, a′ : A.a .= a′.
2.4. A simpler deﬁnition of interfaces
What makes work with the above interface deﬁnition clumsy is that there are too many dependencies. The commands
depend on the states, the responses on the commands and the next state on the state, the command and the response.
This seems to be redundant since the information to which state a command belongs should already be given by the
command itself and similarly for the responses and the next state. Hence the responses should depend only on the
command and the next state on the response. The way to achieve this is to work with families instead of predicates:
Deﬁnition 3 (Interface). An interface is given by sets S,C,R and functions st : C → S, co : R → C, nxt : R → S.
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Given an interface (S, C,R, n) in the sense of Hancock/Setzer we get an interface in the new sense by
st := PredToFam C
co := PredToFam R′
and setting
nxt(((s, c), r)) := n s c r,
where R′ is the uncurried version of R. The altered deﬁnition determines a functor (see Section 4). We are going
to prove that this functor has a ﬁnal coalgebra and use this result to get a ﬁnal coalgebra for the original functor of
Hancock/Setzer above. However, we have not succeeded to prove the result in its most general form for arbitrary sets
S, C. In order for the proof to go through we need a principle known as uniqueness of identity proofs on the sets S, C.
This principle states that all the inhabitants of a .= a′ are identical, that is,
∀a, a′ : A. Collapse (a .= a′).
We write UIP A for ∀a, a′ : A. Collapse (a .= a′). As shown by Hofmann [21,22] UIP A is not provable for arbitrary
sets A. However, it is provable for the enumeration types, the natural number type and preserved by the identity type
and the sum type constructors [21], that is,
UIP A ⇒ ∀a, a′ : A.UIP (a .=A a′)
and
UIP A ⇒ (∀a : A.UIP B a) ⇒ UIP ∑(A,B).
More general UIP A follows from decidability of identity [20] that is
∀a, a′ : A.(a .=A a′) ∨ (a  .=A a′),
which is also preserved by the sum type constructor. Streicher [42] noticed that UIP A is provable if in the elimination
rules for the above identity type the type of C is changed from (x, y : A,p : x .=A y) → Set to (x : A,p :
x
.=A x) → Set. Using this elimination rule is equivalent to pattern matching [31], which therefore proves UIP as well.
However, in this case elimination cannot be justiﬁed as structural induction. In the following we assume UIP for the sets
S and C.
3. The category of S-indexed families of setoids
We are going to deﬁne the category of S-indexed families of setoids. The ambient category of setoids is a model of
intensional type theory [21]. The set of states S determines the following (presheaf-)category: objects are triples
X : S → Set
≡X: (s : S, X s,X s) → Set
eqX : (s : S) → equivalence (≡X s),
where equivalence R says that R is an equivalence (reﬂexive, transitive, symmetric) relation.
We use the notations ≡, ≡X and ≡s for the binary relation (s : S)
≡X s ⊆ X s × X s.
We say ≡X: (s : S) → X s → X s → Set is an equivalence relation iff all relations ≡s⊆ X s × X s are equivalence
relations. Morphism f : (X,≡X, eqX) → (Y,≡Y , eqY ) are given by a family of S-indexed extensional functions in
the sense that
f : (s : S) → X s → Y s
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and
x ≡X x′ ⇒ f s x ≡Y f s x′
for s : S, x, x′ : X s. We use the same notation for the morphism and the function f. If we want to emphasize the
relations ≡X, ≡Y we sometimes say that f is (≡X,≡Y )-extensional. We identify f, g : (X,≡X, eqX) → (Y,≡Y , eqY )
iff
x ≡X x′ ⇒ f s x ≡Y g s x′
for all s : S, x, x′ : X s.
It is easily veriﬁed that this gives a category.
4. The endofunctor Prog
The interface (S,C,R, st, co, nxt) determines the endofunctor Prog given by
Prog X s : Set
= sig command : C
idSco : (st c) .= s
nextEl : (r : R, (co r) .= c) → X(nxt r)
for X : S → Set with equivalence relation
Prog ≡X s 〈c0, ids0, f0〉 〈c1, ids1, f1〉 : Set
= sig idc : c0 .= c1
fct : (r : R, idcr : (co r) .= c0) → f0 r idcr ≡(nxt r) f1 r idcr′,
where idcr′ := subst idc idcr. We use the notation ≡Prog for this relation. By some simple calculations it follows that
≡Prog is an equivalence relation if ≡ is an equivalence relation. We allow some abuse of notations. Prog takes a family
of sets X : S → Set, an equivalence relation ≡X on X and a witness for the fact that ≡X is an equivalence relation
and gives a triple consisting of a family of sets Prog X : S → Set an equivalence relation Prog ≡X on Prog X and a
corresponding witness.
The morphism part of the functor Prog is given by
Prog g s : Prog X s → Prog Y s
Prog g s 〈c, ids, f 〉 = 〈c, ids, r : R, idc : (co r) .= c. g (nxt r) (f r idc)〉.
If g is extensional then Prog g is extensional too. To see this, let
〈c0, ids0, f0〉 ≡Prog 〈c1, ids1, f1〉.2
Then we have idc : c0 .= c1. Let r : R and idcr : (co r) .= c0. We have
f0 r idcr ≡(nxt r) f1 r idcr′,
where idcr′ is obtained from idcr by idc. We must show that
g (nxt r) (f0 r idcr) ≡(nxt r) g (nxt r) (f1 r idcr′).
But this follows by the extensionality of g.
The deﬁning properties for a functor are easily veriﬁed.
2Remember that this means that the type is inhabited.
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5. The coalgebra of computation trees
A possible ﬁrst approach 3 to construct a ﬁnal coalgebra representing the programs of Hancock/Setzer might be to
work in the category of setoids [21,5]. The ﬁnal coalgebra for the functor Prog ought to be deﬁned by means of the set
(List R) → C together with an appropriate equivalence relation. Given a morphism g : B → Prog B the idea is now
to deﬁne an element treeg,b : (List R) → C for b : B by
treeg,b () := (g b)command,
treeg,b (l, r) :=
{
(g b′)command if co r
.= treeg,b l,
some “junk” otherwise,
where b′ has to be deﬁned simultaneously by means of (g _)nextEl . However, this approach does not work. The reason is
that we do not have c .= c′ ∨ c  .= c′ for c, c′ : C in general, i.e. identity on C must not be decidable. As a consequence,
we cannot deﬁne treeg,b by case distinction as above. Instead, we have to prove our envisaged result by doing it the
hard way 4 : we are going to deﬁne the object of the ﬁnal coalgebra as a set of trees containing exactly the information
a program needs to have. While well-founded trees can be represented in type theory by inductive types, for non-well-
founded ones we have to resort to a more traditional mathematical deﬁnition: a tree is identiﬁed with the set of its paths.
Speciﬁcally, for us paths are traces of computations represented by sequences of commands and responses (and states,
but these are determined by the command). There must be a restriction, given by logical information in the sequence,
that guarantees the agreement of states, commands and responses. This logical information ensures that the sequence
is a possible computation path for the interface. It is given by identity proofs. In the next step we have to deﬁne subsets
of traces corresponding to trees which then will give us the set of programs we are looking for. Subsets can be deﬁned
in type theory as predicates, that is, functions to Set. But to single out certain predicates which correspond to programs
does not work because then the type of trees would not be a set. Alternatively, we can see subsets as functions to bool,
but this is not possible in our case because we do not have decidability. The actual solution is intermediate: instead
of using the whole universe of sets to characterize trees as subsets of paths, we deﬁne an ad hoc smaller and more
manageable universe generated by the types of states, commands and responses and closed for identity and sigma
types. Computation trees are then represented by functions on dependent sequences of commands and responses into
this universe. We start by deﬁning the set of possible computation paths of the interface:
Deﬁnition 4. Elements of CTSeq s for s : S are either of the form
(c, ids),
where c : C and ids : st c .= s, or of the form
(l, r, idc, c, ids),
where l : CTSeq s, r : R, idc : co r .= co _ l, c : C, ids : st c .= nxt r and co _ l denotes the last command of the
sequence l, i.e.
co _ (c, ids) = co _ (l, r, idc, c, ids) = c.
Note that we have to deﬁne the function co mutually with the sets CTSeq s, i.e. the deﬁnition is by induction–recursion
[10]. The idea here is that a list represents an initial part of a possible program execution. The identities ensure that the
list is accurate for the interface. We need some auxiliary notions:
Deﬁnition 5 (Last state, predecessor). We denote the last state of the sequence l : CTSeq s by st _ l, i.e. st _ (c, ids)
:= s, st _ (l, r, idc, c, ids) := nxt r . We denote the modiﬁed predecessor of the sequence l by pd _ l, i.e. pd _ (c, ids) :=
(c, ids), pd _ (l, r, idc, c, ids) := l.
3 One of the referees of this paper suggested to explore this idea.
4
“. . . the dwarfs found out how to turn lead into gold by doing it the hard way. The difference between that and the easy way is that the hard way
works.” Terry Pratchett, The Truth, 2000.
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Deﬁnition 6 (Append). We deﬁne mutually
l0  〈r, idc〉  l1 : CTSeq s
and an inhabitant of
co _ l1
.= co _ (l0  〈r, idc〉  l1) (1)
for s : S, l0 : CTSeq s, r : R, idc : co r .= co _ l0, l1 : CTSeq (nxt r) by
l0  〈r, idc〉  (c, ids) := (l0, r, idc, c, ids),
l0  〈r, idc〉  (l, r ′, idc′, c, ids) := ((l0  〈r, idc〉  l), r ′, idc′′, c, ids),
where we obtain idc′′ from idc′ by the inhabitant of 1 which is deﬁned as reﬂ c in both cases.
Note that deﬁnition by cases is necessary in the deﬁnition of the inhabitant of 1 since otherwise the terms would not
evaluate.
Proposition 7 (Associativity of append).
l0  〈r0, idc0〉  (l1  〈r1, idc1〉  l2) .= (l0  〈r0, idc0〉  l1)  〈r1, idc′1〉  l2,
where idc′1 is obtained from idc1 by the inhabitant of
co _ l1
.= co _ (l0  〈r0, idc0〉  l1)
due to 1.
Proof. Induction on l2. If l2 (c, ids) both sides of the equation evaluate to the same value. Let l2 (l, r, idc, c, ids).
Let c1 := co _ l1, c′1 := co _ (l0  〈r0, idc0〉  l1).
Let lleft := l0  〈r0, idc0〉  (l1  〈r1, idc1〉  l) and lright := (l0  〈r0, idc0〉  l1)  〈r1, idc′1〉  l. By I.H. we have
idl : lleft .= lright .
Let cl := co _ l, c′l := co _ (l1  〈r1, idc1〉  l), cleft := co _ lleft , cright := co _ lright .
We have inhabitants of
cl
.= c′l , c′l .= cleft, cl .= cright
by which we obtain inhabitants
idc′l : co r .= c′l , idcleft : co r .= cleft, idcright : co r .= cright
from idc. By idl we obtain a second inhabitant
idc′right : co r .= cright
from idcleft and with UIP C we conclude that idc′right
.= idcright and
〈lleft, idcleft〉 .= 〈lright, idcright〉 (2)
by Principle 2. Now l0  〈r0, idc0〉  (l1  〈r1 idc1〉  l2) evaluates to
(lleft, r, idcleft, c, ids)
and (l0  〈r0, idc0〉  l1)  〈r1, idc′1〉  l2 to
(lright, r, idcright, c, ids).
The claim follows by (2) with Principle 1. 
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Remark. Note that to conclude that (2) holds, we have to prove that idc′right equals idcright . We obtained idc′right from
idcleft by shifting it along idl. Since we know nothing 5 about idl (we got idl from the I.H.) we know nothing about
idc′right . So to force the needed equality we apply UIP C.
Corollary 8.
(c, ids0)  〈r, idc〉  l .= (c, ids1)  〈r, idc〉  l
for ids0, ids1 : (st c) .= s.
Proof. With UIP S. 
Corollary 9.
(c0, ids0)  〈r, idc〉  l .= (c1, ids1)  〈r, idc′〉  l
for id : c0 .= c1, idsi : (st ci) .= s (i = 0, 1) and idc′ = subst id idc.
Proof. Case id = reﬂ c. 
We are going to deﬁne a universe U. The deﬁnition is by induction–recursion [10]. The universe U is a relatively
small universe. It contains names for the sets S,C,R and is closed only under the identity and sigma type formers. For
the general rôle of universes in type theory and the proof theoretic strength gained by (much larger) universes compare
[36,41].
Deﬁnition 10 (Universe). We deﬁne mutually
U : Set
= data NameS | NameC | NameR |
NameId (u : U)(e1, e2 : set u) |
NameSig (u : U)(f : (e : set u) → U)
and
set(u : U) : Set
by
set NameS = S
set NameC = C
set NameR = R
set (NameId u e1 e2) = (e1 .=(set u) e2)
set (NameSig u f ) = ∑(e : (set u).(set (f e))).
We write NIdC for NameId NameC.
We want to deﬁne computation trees as functions T : CTSeq s → U with the following properties:
(1) There is exactly one root c : C for the tree.
(2) For every l : CTSeq s which is a node of the tree and for every r : R suitable for l there is exactly one successor,
i.e. one c such that (l, r, idc, c, ids) is a node of the tree.
(3) For every l : CTSeq s which is a node of the tree the predecessor of l is a node of the tree too.
Where a list l is a node of the tree if set (T l) is inhabited and r : R is suitable for l if co r .= co _ l. Technically
a computation tree will be a dependent tuple of a function T together with a witness that the function fulﬁls the
5 At least we do not know if types depending on idl are inhabited.
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properties above (Deﬁnition 12). The properties are expressed by sigma types (Deﬁnition 11).We formalize this ideas as
follows:
Deﬁnition 11. For s : S, T : CTSeq s → U let 1 s T be
sig root : C
idSro : st root .= s
rootex : set (T(root, idSro))
rootuni : ∀ c : C, idsc : st c .= s. set (T (c, idsc)) ⇒ c .= root.
For s : S, T : CTSeq s → U, l : CTSeq s, e : set (T l), r : R and idcr : co r .= (co _ l) let 2 s T l e r idcr be
sig command : C
idSco : st command .= nxt r
commandex : set (T (l, r, idcr, command, idSco))
commanduni : ∀ c : C, idsc : st c .= nxt r. set (T (l, r, idcr, c, idsc)) ⇒
c
.= command .
For s : S, T : CTSeq s → U, l : CTSeq s and e : set (T l) let 3 s T l e be
set (T (pd _ l)).
Let  s T be (1 s T ) ∧ (2 s T ) ∧ (3 s T ).
Note the natural way in which we make use of dependent types in this deﬁnition: we quantify in  only over those l
which are nodes of the tree T: argument e : set (T l) in 1 and 2. This will play an important role later. We are now
able to deﬁne the family of sets in the object part of the ﬁnal coalgebra:
Deﬁnition 12 (Computation trees).
CT (s : S) : Set
= sig tree : CTSeq s → U
phi :  s tree.
Before we deﬁne an equivalence relation on this family we declare the morphism of the ﬁnal coalgebra. We single
out the command of each tree by using the witness for the property 1.
Deﬁnition 13 (Command of a computation tree). For ct : CT s : with ctphi (1, 2, 3)
co _ ct :=1root ,
idSco _ ct :=1idSro .
The program that we obtain after doing one computation step and receiving a response r is represented by the subtree
at branch r. A subtree is given by taking the tree function on another position. The argument is constructed by means
of the append function on lists.
Deﬁnition 14 (elimtree). For ct : CT s, r : R and idc : co r .= co _ ct let
elimtree s ct r idc : CTSeq (nxt r) → U
given by
l : CTSeq (nxt r) . (cttree ((c, ids)  (r, idc)  l)),
where c = co _ ct and ids = idSco _ ct .
We need to prove that the deﬁned function has the properties 1–3.
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Proposition 15. For ct : CT s, r : R and idc : (co r) .= (co _ ct)
1 (nxt r) (elimtree s ct r idc).
Proof. Let c = co _ ct and ids = idSco _ ct . The inhabitant of 1 s cttree gives an inhabitant e : set(cttree s (c, ids)).
The inhabitant of 2 s cttree (c, ids) e r idc proves the claim. 
Proposition 16. For ct : CT s, r : R and idc : (co r) .= (co _ ct)
2 (nxt r) (elimtree s ct r idc).
Proof. Let l : CTSeq (nxt r), e : set (elimtree s ct r idc l), r ′ : R, idc′ : (co r ′) .= (co _ l). Let c = co _ ct and
ids = idSco _ ct . By (1) we get an inhabitant idc′′ : (co r ′) .= (co _ ((c, ids)  〈r, idc〉  l) from idc′ and the inhabitant
of 2 s cttree ((c, ids)  〈r, idc〉  l) e r ′ idc′′ proves the claim. 
Proposition 17. For ct : CT s, r : R and idc : (co r) .= (co _ ct)
3 (nxt r) (elimtree s ct r idc).
Proof. Induction on l : CTSeq (nxt r). 
The morphism part of the ﬁnal coalgebra is now given by:
Deﬁnition 18 (elim). For ct : CT s we deﬁne
elim s ct : Prog s CT
by
〈co _ ct, idSco _ ct, nextEl〉,
where nextEl r idc : CT (nxt r) is given by elimtree s ct r idc and Propositions 15–17 for r : R and idc : (co r)
.= (co _ ct).
We write nextEl _ ct for (elim _ ct)nextEl .
5.1. Bisimulation
We still need to deﬁne an equivalence relation onCT. The equivalence relation we are going to deﬁne expresses when
two programs behave in the same way. This is the case if they start with equal commands and give equivalent programs
for equal responses. The function elim gives a labelled transition system. There is a transition r : R between trees T0
and T1 if T1 is the subtree of T0 at branch r. Since this transition system is image ﬁnite we can deﬁne bisimulation by
means of natural induction.
Deﬁnition 19 (Bisimulation). For ct, ct ′ : CT s, n : N we deﬁne
ct ∼n ct ′ : Set
by
ct ∼zero ct ′ = True,
ct ∼succ n ct ′ = sig idc : c .= c′
fct : (r : R, idcr : (co r) .= c) → f r idcr ∼n f ′ r idcr′
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and
ct ∼ ct ′ : Set
= ∀ n : N. ct ∼n ct ′,
where elim s ct 〈c, idc, f 〉, elim s ct ′ 〈c′, idc′, f ′〉 and idcr′ is obtained from idcr by idc.
Proposition 20. ∼ is an equivalence relation on CT.
Proof. Straightforward. 
Proposition 21.
ct ∼ ct ′ ⇔ elim s ct ∼Prog elim s ct ′
for ct, ct ′ : CT s.
Proof. “⇒” Follows with UIP C.
“⇐” Trivial. 
Corollary 22. elim : CT → Prog CT is extensional.
This means that elim is a coalgebra morphism. We are going to prove that elim : CT → Prog CT is a ﬁnal coalgebra
for Prog.
6. The unique morphism T into the ﬁnal coalgebra
Let B : S → Set and g : (s : S, B s) → Prog B s. We keep B, g ﬁxed for the rest of the article. We write co _ b,
idSco _ b and nextEl s b for (g s b)command, (g s b)idSco , (g s b)nextEl , respectively, where b : B s. We must ﬁnd a
unique morphism T : B → CT with elim ◦ T = Prog T ◦ g, i.e. elim s (T s b) ∼Prog (Prog T) s (g s b) for s : S,
b : B s. We get T by deﬁning mutually the function value Ttree s b l : U for l : CTSeq s and an element of B (nxt r)
for those l which are nodes of Ttree s b where r is a response of co _ l. This element is essentially the element which
we get if we follow g along the responses which occur in l including r. The list (c, ids) is a node of the tree Ttree s b if
c is the command played by g at b, i.e. (co _ b) .= c. The list (l, r, _, c, _) is a node of the tree Ttree s b if l is a node of
Ttree s b and c is the command played by g at the element of B (nxt r) described above. Things again become quite
involved since we have to shift the identities to meet the typing requirements.
Deﬁnition 23. We deﬁne mutually
Ttree s b l : U
and
A s b l r idc e : B (nxt r)
for s : S, b : B s, l : CTSeq s, r : R, idc : co r .= co _ l and e : set (Ttree s b l) by
Ttree s b (c, ids) := NIdC c (co _ b),
Ttree s b (l′, r ′, idc′, c, ids) := NameSig (Ttree s b l′)
(e : set(Ttree s b l′).NIdC c (c′ e)),
where c′ e := co _ (A s b l′ r ′ idc′ e) and
A s b (c, ids) r idc e := nextEl s b r idce,
A s b (l′, r ′, idc′, c, ids) r idc e := nextEl (nxt r ′) b′ r idc′′,
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where in the ﬁrst case idce is the composition of idc and e, and in the second case b′ := A s b l′ r ′ idc′ efst,
esnd : c .= (co _ b′) and idc′′ := subst esnd idc.
We lift UIP C to set(Ttree s b l):
Proposition 24.
∀p, q : set(Ttree s b l) ⇒ p .= q
for s : S, b : B s, l : CTSeq s.
Proof. If l (c, ids) this is UIP C.
Let l (l′, r, idc, c, ids),p, q : set(Ttree s b l)withp 〈p′, idcp〉 andq 〈q ′, idcq〉.Wehave id : p′ .=set(T s b l′)
q ′ by I.H. and idcp′ .= idcq by UIP C where we obtain idcp′ from idcp by id. This proves the claim. 
Corollary 25.
A s b l r idc p .= A s b l r idc q
for s : S, b : B s, l : CTSeq s, r : R, idc : (co r) .= (co _ l) and p, q : set (Ttree s b l).
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 24. 
The following three propositions state that Ttree s b is indeed an element of CT, i.e. that Ttree s b fulﬁls the
properties 1–3.
Proposition 26. For s : S, b : B s
1 s (Ttree s b).
Proof. The following term proves the claim:
〈co _ b, idSco _ b, reﬂ (co _ b), rootuniT〉,
where rootuniT c idsc p := p for c : C, idsc : (st c) .= s and p : set(Ttree s b (c, idsc)). 
Proposition 27. For s : S, b : B s
2 s (Ttree s b).
Proof. Let l : CTSeq s, p : set (Ttree s b l), r : R, idcr : (co r) .= (co _ l).
For x : set(Ttree s b l) let b′ x := A s b l r idcr x, c′ x := co _ (b′ x) and ids′ x := idSco _ (b′ x). The following
term proves the claim:
〈c′ p, ids′ p, (p, reﬂ c′ p), commanduniT〉,
where commanduniT c idsc q := subst id qsnd and id : qfst .= p the inhabitant according to Proposition 24 for
c : C, idsc : st c .= nxt r and q : set(Ttree s b (l  〈r, idcr〉  (c, idsc))). 
Proposition 28. For s : S, b : B s
3 s (Ttree s b).
Proof. Obvious. 
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Deﬁnition 29. Let T(s : S)(b : B s) : CT s be
〈Ttree s b,Tphi s b〉,
where Tphi s b is given by Propositions 26–28.
We postpone the proof that T is extensional.
7. The repetition of the unique morphism T
We want to prove that T is the unique morphism making the coalgebra square below commute.
B
g Prog B
CT
T

elim
 Prog CT
Prog T

That means we have to prove
b0 ≡ b1 ⇒ (Prog T ◦ g) _ b0 ∼ (elim ◦ T) _ b1
for s : S and b0, b1 : B s, where ≡ denotes the equivalence relation on B. We have
ct0 ∼n ct1 ⇔ co _ ct0 .= co _ ct1 and
nextEl _ ct0 r0 idcr0 ∼n−1 nextEl _ ct1 r0 idcr′0
⇔ . . . and
nextEl _ (nextEl _ ct0 r0 idcr0) r1 idcr1 ∼n−2
nextEl _ (nextEl _ ct1 r0 idcr′0) r1 idcr′1
⇔ . . .
for ct0, ct1 : CT s. This observation leads to the deﬁnition of the repetition TRep of T which we use in the following
to prove the coalgebra property. We deﬁne the repetition TRep of T for every sequence l : CTSeq s which belongs to
Ttree s b. Essentially this will be the subtree of Ttree which we get when we follow the tree along the path l. We want
to deﬁne this by recursion on l. Again this cannot be done in a straightforward way, since the elements we get by the
induction hypothesis do not have the desired type. That means we have to shift them along certain identities which
must be deﬁned simultaneously. Therefore we deﬁne mutually
TRep s b l p : CT(st _ l)
and identities
co _ l .= C co _ (TRep s b l p), (3)
(TRep s b l p)tree l
′ .= U Ttree s b (l#l′), (4)
where s : S, b : B s, l : CTSeq s, p : set(Ttree s b l), l′ : CTSeq(st _ l) and
(c, ids)#l′ := l′,
(l0, r, idc, c, ids)#l′ := (l0  〈r, idc〉  l′).
The second identity (in U) is needed to prove the ﬁrst one (in C). Note that l#(c, ids) l if l (c, ids) or
l (l0, r, idc, c, ids).
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Deﬁnition 30 (Repetition of T). We deﬁne mutually
TRep(s : S)(b : B s)(l : CTSeq s)(p : set(Ttree s b l)) : CT (st _ l)
by
TRep s b (c, ids) p = T s b
TRep s b (l′ r idc c ids) p = nextEl _ (TRep s b l′ p′) r idc′,
where the witness saying that l′ belongs to the tree T s b is given by p′ = 3 s b l p where 3 : 3 s (Ttree s b) as in
Proposition 28. The identity idc′ is obtained from idc by identity 3. Identity 3 is deﬁned in the next step.
We deﬁne an inhabitant of
co _ l .= co _ (TRep s b l p)
by
p if l = (c, ids),
1rootuni c ids p
′ if l = (l′, r, idc, c, ids),
where 1 : 1 _ (TRep s b l p) as given by Proposition 26. The witness p′ saying that (c, ids) belongs to the tree
TRep s b l p is obtained from p by identity (4) since l#(c, ids) l. Identity (4) is deﬁned in the next step.
To complete the deﬁnition we must deﬁne an inhabitant of
(TRep s b l p)tree l
′ .= Ttree s b (l#l′)
for s : S, b : B s, l : CTSeq s, p : set(T s b l) and l′ : CTSeq (st _ l).
In the case l (c, ids) an inhabitant of this type is given by
reﬂ (Ttree s b (l#l′))
since both sides of the equation evaluate to the same value.
For l (l0, r, idc, c, ids) let p′ be as above,
s0 := st _ l0,
cl0 := co _ (TRep s b l0 p′),
idcsl0 := idSco _ (TRep s b l0 p′),
sl0 := (cl0 , idcsl0),
sl1 := (c0, idcs0),
where l0 = (. . . , c0, idcs0) and idc′ is obtained from idc by identity (3). Let
left = (TRep s b l0 p′)tree (sl0  〈r, idc′〉  l′),
middle = Ttree s b (l0#(sl0  〈r, idc′〉  l′)),
right = Ttree s b (l0  〈r, idc〉  l′).
We must prove left .= right. We have sl0  〈r, idc′〉  l′ .= sl1  〈r, idc〉  l′ by Corollary 9 and by I.H.
left .= middle.
If l0 (c0, idcs0) then
middle .= right
by Principle 1 and we are done.
If l0 (l1, r0, idcr0, c0, idcs0) then
l1  〈r0, idcr0〉  (sl0  〈r, idc〉  l′) .= l1  〈r0, idcr0〉  (sl1  〈r, idc′〉  l′)
.= (l1  〈r0, idcr0〉  sl1)  〈r, idc′〉  l′
.= l0  〈r, idc′〉  l′,
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where the ﬁrst equation follows by Principle 1 and the second by the associativity of . Principle 1 gives
middle .= right
and we are done again. This ﬁnishes the deﬁnition of TRep.
Remark. Note that we could deﬁne the repetition of ct for arbitrary ct : CT s. Therefore we can proceed in a similar
way as above. We just need to replace p by 1rootuni c ids p in the ﬁrst case of the construction of the inhabitant of
identity (3) where 1 is the witness for 1 s ct . However, since this greater generality has no particular advantage for
us we work with the deﬁnition above.
As a corollary to Proposition 24 we get:
Corollary 31.
TRep s b l p
.= TRep s b l q
for p, q : Ttree s b l.
We need some auxiliary deﬁnitions. Let
nxtS s (c, ids) r := nxt r,
nxtS s (l′, r ′, idc, c, ids) r := nxtS s l′ r ′,
pred s (c′, ids′) r idc c ids := (c, ids),
pred s (l′, r ′, idc′, c′, ids′) r idc c ids := ((pred s l′ r ′ idc′ c′ ids′), r, idcr, c, ids),
where idcr is obtained from idc by the simultaneously deﬁned inhabitant of
c
.= co _ (pred s l r idc c ids), (5)
which is given in both cases by reﬂ c. Note that deﬁnition by cases is necessary again to deﬁne this inhabitant. The
operation pred _ l_ cuts off the ﬁrst command and response of the list l. Since this is only possible for lists of
the form (l′, r ′, idc′, c′, ids′) we use the auxiliary arguments r, idc, c and ids. The obtained list is an inhabitant of
CTSeq (nxtS s l r). Further, we deﬁne an inhabitant of B (nxtS s l r) by
nextB s (c′, ids′) r idc c ids b (id0, id1) := A s b (c′, ids′) r idc id0,
nextB s (l′, r ′, idc′, c′, ids′) r idc c ids b (p′, id1) := nextB s l′ r ′ idc′ c′ ids′ b p′,
where b : B s and p : set (Ttree s b (l, r, idc, c, ids)) for p (id0, id1), p (p′, id1) and l (c′, ids′),
l (l′, r ′, idc′, c′, ids′), respectively. The inhabitant nextB _ l r _ is calculated by doing essentially only the ﬁrst
step in the calculation of A _ l r _. Whereas A _ l r _ gives us an element of B (nxt r) by following all responses in
l including r, nextB _ l r _ is doing only the ﬁrst step. The following proposition states that we get equal elements in
B (nxt r0) whether we apply A on b and a sequence (l, r, idcr, c, idsc) or do one step from b along this sequence and
apply A on the new bn and the sequence obtained from (l, r, idcr, c, idsc) by pred above.
Proposition 32. For s : S, l : CTSeq s, r, r0 : R, c : C, b : B s,
idcr : co r .= co _ l,
idsc : st c .= nxt r,
idcr0 : co r0 .= c,
p : set (Ttree s b (l, r, idcr, c, idsc)), q : set (Ttree sn bn lp), where
sn = nxtS s l r,
bn = nextB s l r idcr c idsc b p,
lp = pred s l r idcr c idsc,
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we have
A s b (l, r, idcr, c, idsc) r0 idcr0 p
.= A sn bn lp r0 idcr′0 q,
where idcr′0 is obtained from idcr0 by identity (5).
Proof. Case l (c′, ids), p (id0, id1).
Then idcr′0 evaluates to idcr0. Let idcr1, idcr2 be obtained from idcr0 by id1, q, respectively. By UIP C we have
idcr1
.= idcr2
and by Principle 1 we get
A s b ((c′, ids), r, idcr, c, idsc) r0 idcr0 (id0, id1)
.= f idcr1
.= f idcr2
.= A sn bn lp r0 idcr0 q,
where f = (g (nxt r) ((g s b)nextEl r idcr′))nextEl r0 and idcr′ is obtained from idcr by id0.
Case l (l′, r ′, idc′, c′, ids), p (p′, id1), q (q ′, id2).
Then again idcr′0 evaluates to idcr0. We deﬁne
f : (x : B (nxt r)) → IdC x → B (nxt r0),
where IdC x := ((co r0) .= (co _ x)) by
f x y = (g (nxt r) x)nextEl r0 y
for x : B (nxt r), y : IdC x.
By I.H. we have
ih : A s b (l′, r ′, idc′, c′, ids) r idcr p′︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: left_b
.= A s′n b′n l′p r idcr2 q ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: right_b
,
where idcr2 is obtained from idcr by identity (5) and
s′n := nxtS s l′ r ′,
b′n := nextB s l′ r ′ idcr′ c′ ids b p′,
l′p := pred s l′ r ′ idcr′ c′ ids.
Let idcr1, idcr3 be obtained from idcr0 by id1, id2, respectively. By UIP C we get
subst ih idcr1
.= idcr3.
That means
(left_b, idcr1) .= (right_b, idcr3)
and by Principle 1 we get
A s b (l, r, idcr, c, idsc) r0 idcr0 p
.= f left_b idcr1
.= f right_b idcr3
.= A sn bn lp r0 idcr′0 q. 
Corollary 33.
co _ (A s b (l, r, idcr, c, idsc) r0 idcr0 p)
.= co _ (A sn bn lp r0 idcr′0 q).
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Let s : S, l : CTSeq s, r : R, idcr : (co r) .= (co _ l), c : C, idsc : (st c) .= (nxt r). We deﬁne an inhabitant of
st _ (l, r, idcr, c, idsc) .= st _ (pred s l r idcr c idsc) (6)
by reﬂ (nxt r) according to the shape of l. Again deﬁnition by cases is necessary to deﬁne this inhabitant. The following
lemma will be our main tool to prove all desired properties of T. Roughly speaking it says that we get the same trees
whether we take the subtree following the tree at b along the path (l, r, idcr, c, idsc) or do one step from b along this
sequence (get a new bn) and following the tree at bn along the path obtained from (l, r, idcr, c, idsc) by pred above.
Lemma 34 (Main Lemma). Let s, l, r, c, b, idcr, idsc, p, q as well as sn, bn, lp be as in Proposition 32. Then
T′Rep s b (l, r, idcr, c, idsc) p ∼ TRep sn bn lp q,
where we obtain the left term from TRep s b (l, r, idcr, c, idsc) p by identity (6).
Proof. We have to distinguish cases l (c′, ids) and l (l′, r ′, idc′, c′, ids) in order to have
T′Rep s b (l, r, idcr, c, idsc) pTRep s b (l, r, idcr, c, idsc) p.
However, the proof proceeds in the same way in both cases:
Let n : N. For n zero is nothing to do. Let n succ m. Let l+ := (l, r, idcr, c, idsc) and
c0 := co _ (TRep s b l+ p),
c1 := c,
c2 := co _ lp,
c3 := co _ (TRep sn bn lp q).
We have
c0
.= c1 .= c2 .= c3,
where the ﬁrst and last equations follow with identity (3) and the second with identity (5).
Now let r0 : R and idcr0 : co r0 .= c0. For i = 0, 1, 2 we obtain elements idcri+1 : co r0 .= ci+1 from idcri
by the above identities. Further, we obtain a second element idcr′0 : co r0 .= c0 from idcr1 and a second element
idcr′3 : co r0 .= c3 from idcr0. We have idcr0 .= idcr′0 and idcr3 .= idcr′3. 6 Let
nxt_lft := nextEl _ (TRep s b l+ p) r0,
nxt_rgt := nextEl _ (TRep sn bn lp q) r0,
and ct0 := nxt_lft idcr′0, ct1 := nxt_lft idcr0, ct2 := nxt_rgt idcr3, ct3 := nxt_rgt idcr′3. We have ct0 .= ct1 and
ct2
.= ct3. We have to prove ct1 ∼m ct3. Therefore it is enough to prove
ct0 ∼m ct2.
Let
cp := co _ (A s b l+ r0 idcr1 p),
cp_id := idSco _ (A s b l+ r0 idcr1 p)
idcp given by identity (5).
We have
(p, reﬂ cp) : set(Ttree s b (l+, r0, idcr1, cp, cp_id)),
(q, idcp) : set(Ttree sn bn (pred s l+ r0 idcr1 cp cp_id))
6 We do not need UIP C for this.
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and
ct0T′Rep s b (l
+, r0, idcr1, cp, cp_id) (p, reﬂ cp),
ct2TRep sn bn (pred s l+ r0 idcr1 cp cp_id) (q, idcp).
Therefore the claim follows by I.H. applied to s : S, l+ : CTSeq s, r0 : R, cp : C, b : B s, idcr1 : co r0 .= c,
cp_id : st cp .= nxt r0, (p, reﬂ cp), (q, idcp) and m : N. 
Corollary 35. For s : S, b : B s, r : R, idcr : (co r) .= co _ (T s b), we have
(elim s (T s b))nextEl r idcr ∼ (Prog T s (g s b))nextEl r idcr.
Proof. Apply the Main Lemma to
s, (c0, ids0), r, c1, b, idcr, ids1, (reﬂ c0, reﬂ c2), reﬂ c3,
where
c0 := co _ (T s b),
ids0 := idSco _ (T s b),
c1 := co _ (nextEl _ (T s b) r idcr),
ids1 := idSco _ (nextEl _ (T s b) r idcr),
c2 := co _ (A s b (c0, ids0) r idcr (reﬂ c0)),
c3 := co _ ((g s b)nextEl r idcr). 
Note that (Prog T s (g s b))nextEl r idcrT (nxt r) ((g s b)nextEl r idcr).
8. Proof of the ﬁnal coalgebra property
Proposition 36. If g is extensional, then T is extensional.
Proof. We denote the equivalence relation on B by ≡ and the witness that g is extensional by ext. The proof is by
natural induction. Let s : S, b0, b1 : B s, rel : b0 ≡ b1, n succ m : N. Let
c0 := co _ (T s b0),
c1 := co _ (T s b1),
left_fun := (g s b0)nextEl ,
right_fun := (g s b1)nextEl ,
id := (ext s b0 b1 rel)idc : c0 .= c1.
The term id gives the ﬁrst component of the inhabitant we have to construct. For the second component let r : R,
idcr : (co r) .= c0. We have to prove
(elim s (T s b0))nextEl r idcr ∼m (elim s (T s b1))nextEl r idcr′,
where idcr′ := subst id idcr. Let b′0 := left_fun r idcr, b′1 := right_fun r idcr′, then (ext s b0 b1 rel)fct r idcr gives
b′0 ≡ b′1 and by I.H. we have
T (nxt r) b′0 ∼m T (nxt r) b′1.
The claim follows with Corollary 35. 
M. Michelbrink / Theoretical Computer Science 360 (2006) 415–439 435
Lemma 37.
elim ◦ T = Prog T ◦ g.
Proof. Let s : S, b0, b1 : B s, rel : b0 ≡ b1, c0 := ((elim ◦ T) s b0)command, c1 := ((Prog T ◦ g) s b1)command. It is
id := ext s b0 b1 rel : c0 .= c1. Let n : N, r : R and idcr : (co r) .= c0. Then follows
((elim ◦ T) s b0)nextEl r idcr ∼n ((Prog T ◦ g) s b0)nextEl r idcr′ ∼n ((Prog T ◦ g) s b1)nextEl r idcr′,
where idcr′ := subst id idcr and the ﬁrst relation follows by Corollary 35 and the second by the extensionality of g
and Prog T. 
Lemma 38. For T′ : B → CT with
elim ◦ T′ = Prog T′ ◦ g
we have T′ = T.
Proof. Natural induction. Let s : S, b0, b1 : B s, rel : b0 ≡ b1, n succ m : N. Let comm : elim ◦ T′ = Prog T′ ◦ g,
c0 := ((elim ◦ T′) s b0)command, c1 := ((elim ◦ T) s b1)command. Then
id := (comm s b0 b1 rel)idc : c0 .= c1.
Let r : R and idcr : (co r) .= c0, then
(T′ s b0)nextEl r idcr ∼n T′ (nxt r) ((g s b1)nextEl r idcr′) (7)
∼n T (nxt r) ((g s b1)nextEl r idcr′) (8)
∼n (T s b1)nextEl r idcr′, (9)
where idcr′ := subst id idcr. Relation (7) follows by
(comm s b0 b1 rel)fct r idcr,
relation (8) by the I.H. and the fact that ≡ is reﬂexive and relation (9) by Corollary 35. 
Theorem 39. elim : CT → Prog CT is a ﬁnal coalgebra for Prog.
Proof. Lemmata 37 and 38. 
9. Carry over the result to the original functor of Hancock/Setzer
In this section we are going to translate the result to the original functor ProgHS of Hancock/Setzer above. We ﬁrst
notice that we can write an uncurried version of the functor Prog as
Proguc X s :=
∑
(p : (FamToPred′ st) s,
(q : (FamToPred′ co) pfst) → X (nxt qfst)).
We can prove a ﬁnal coalgebra theorem for this functor in the same way as above (this is just a rearrangement of
parentheses). If (S,C,R, st, co, nxt) comes from a Hancock/Setzer interface (S, C,R, n) as described in Section 2.4,
Proguc X s rewrites is rewritten as∑
(p : ∑(sc : ∑(S, C), (st sc) .= s),
(q : ∑(scr : ∑(∑(S, C), R′), (co scr) .=∑(S,C) pfst)) → X (nxt qfst)),
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where st and co are the ﬁrst projections and R′ is the uncurried version of R. We deﬁne functions
u_hs : Proguc X s → ProgHS X s
by
〈〈〈s′, c〉, id〉, f 〉 → 〈c′, f ′〉,
where c′ := subst id c, f ′ r := f 〈〈〈s, c′〉, r〉, id′〉 and id′ : 〈s, c′〉 .= 〈s′, c〉 is deﬁned by structural induction on
id : s′ .= s and
hs_u : ProgHS X s → Proguc X s
by
〈c, f 〉 → 〈〈〈s, c〉, reﬂ s〉, f ′〉,
where f ′ p = (subst psnd f ) pfst.
We have p u_hs (hs_u p) and therefore p .= u_hs (hs_u p). We deﬁne equivalence relations on Proguc X s
by
〈scid0, f0〉〈scid1, f1〉 :⇔ ∃id : scid0 .= scid1.pointeq (f ′0 id) f1,
where f ′0 id := subst id f0 and pointeq (f ′0 id) f1 expresses that (f ′0 id), f1 are pointwise equal. By structural
induction on id follows that we have
 ⊂ ≡Prog
for arbitrary equivalence relations ≡ on X. Further, we have:
Proposition 40.
p hs_u (u_hs p)
for p : Proguc X s.
Proof. Let p 〈〈〈s′, c′〉, ids〉, f 〉. We prove
〈〈〈s′, c′〉, ids〉, f 〉hs_u (u_hs 〈〈〈s′, c′〉, ids〉, f 〉)
by structural induction on ids. That means we have to prove
〈〈〈s, c′〉, reﬂ s〉, f 〉hs_u (u_hs 〈〈〈s, c′〉, reﬂ s〉, f 〉).
We get an inhabitant of this type by setting the ﬁrst component
reﬂ 〈〈s, c′〉, reﬂ s〉.
The second component must now have type
pointeq f (hs_u 〈c, f ′〉)snd,
where f ′ := r : R′ 〈s, c′〉.f 〈〈〈s, c′〉, r〉, reﬂ 〈s, c′〉〉. Let sc′ : ∑(S, C) and 〈〈sc, r〉, idsc〉 : ∑(scr : ∑(∑(S, C),
R′), scrfst
.=∑(S,C) sc′). By structural induction on idsc we get
f 〈〈sc, r〉, idsc〉 .= (subst idsc f ′′) r,
where f ′′ := r : R′ sc′.f 〈〈sc′, r〉, reﬂ sc′〉. By setting sc′ = 〈s, c′〉 we get
f 〈〈sc, r〉, idsc〉 .= (hs_u 〈c, f ′〉)snd 〈〈sc, r〉, idsc〉. 
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Corollary 41.
p ≡Prog hs_u (u_hs p)
for p : Proguc X s.
To view ProgHS as a functor in our category we must say what ProgHS is doing on the equivalence relations ≡ on
X. Therefore we deﬁne
p ≡ProgHS q :⇔ (hs_u p) ≡Prog (hs_u q).
hs_u, u_hs are extensional in respect of this relation and we have
hs_u(u_hs p) ≡Prog p u_hs(hs_u q) ≡ProgHS q,
i.e. Proguc X s and ProgHS X s are isomorphic in our category. We have
UIP S, UIP C ⇔ UIP S ∧ ∀s : S.UIP C s.
Therefore we get:
Theorem 42. If UIP S ∧ ∀s : S.UIP C s then u_hs ◦ elim : CT → ProgHS CT is a ﬁnal coalgebra for ProgHS.
10. Related and future work
As we have seen, working in intensional type theory becomes quite complicated. The dependency on proof objects
for simple equations results in an intricate argumentation. We also needed the principle UIP for the sets S, C for our
proof to go through. So, what did we gain by the result above? First of all as already mentioned the result can be seen as
a justiﬁcation for the rules of Hancock/Setzer if we replace deﬁnitional equality by bisimulation and have UIP for the
sets S, C. We are convinced that replacing deﬁnitional identity by bisimulation is not a serious restriction as long as we
are mainly interested in the behaviour of programs. Results such as those in Michelbrink/Setzer [34] that the monad
rules hold should be provable with the altered rules. There is also an advantage if we want to prove facts about the
behaviour of concrete interactive programs: we proved that the functor ProgHS has a ﬁnal coalgebra whereas the rules
of Hancock/Setzer give us a weakly ﬁnal coalgebra only (uniqueness is missing). This should outweigh that concrete
interactive programs are given by extensional functions X → Prog X whereas in the approach of Hancock/Setzer any
such function is sufﬁcient. Sets S,C with UIP S, UIP C may as well be sufﬁcient for practical work. However, from
a theoretical point of view this restriction is unsatisfactory. It would be nice to improve the above result by getting rid
of these conditions. However, the type theory enriched by the rules for a weakly ﬁnal coalgebra as described in e.g.
[34] results in far more elegant proofs. Note also that more types become deﬁnitional equal by these rules whereas two
types which depend on bisimular programs do not have to be equal. Secondly a deeper analysis of the above proof and a
comparison with proofs in other frameworks may shed some light on why working in intensional type theory is so hard.
The same ﬁnal coalgebra construction is already carried out in ZFC [34] and Gambino/Hyland [12] proved an initial
algebra theorem in extensional type theory. The problem of representing ﬁnal coalgebras in type theory was addressed
by Lindström [26] for the special case of Aczel’s non-well-founded sets. Lindström used an inverse-limit construction
that requires extensional type theory. What can be said already is that the lack of a good concept for subsets as in set
theory complicates work. Note that the subset theory discussed in Nordström et al. [35] may be of less or no help as
long as we work in an intensional setting [39,38]. We think that Luo’s coercive subtyping [27] may at least be a way
to get crisper formulations.
There is an increasing interest in approaches to reason in dependent type theory about imperative programming,
interaction, non-termination and general recursion. We would like to mention recent work of Michael Abbott, Thorsten
Altenkirch, Neil Ghani and Conor McBride on containers [1–4]. The extension of a container (the result of applying the
container construction functor to a container) is a special variant of our functorProgHS. More precisely a container with
parameters is a state dependent interface with trivial n where the command sets do not depend on the state. The main
difference to our work is that Abbott et al. work in an extensional type theory (the identity type is given by equalizers). In
fact, they require their ambient category to be locally cartesian closed, with disjoint coproducts,W- andM-sets. Geuvers
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[13] investigated formalizations of inductive and coinductive types in different lambda calculi, mainly extensions of the
polymorphic lambda calculus. He showed that by adding a categorical notion of (primitive) recursion, recursion can be
deﬁned by corecursion and vice versa using polymorphism. Coquand proposed in [8] to add a guarded proof induction
principle to type theory to reason about inﬁnite objects. He gives a syntactical criterion to ensure that every term has a
head normal form.Gimenéz [14] formalized an extension of theCalculus of Constructionwith inductive and coinductive
types using similar ideas. In Capretta’s [6] Ph.D. thesis coinductive types are added to Martin-Löf type theory with
bisimulation as equality. Filliatre [11] interpreted Hoare triples for a programming language with both imperative
and functional features in the Calculus of Inductive Constructions and proved a correctness result. There is ongoing
work following the line initiated by Peter Hancock and Anton Setzer [15–19,23,34] on reasoning about interfaces and
programs using ideas from category theory and functional programming, linear logic, game theory, reﬁnement calculus
and formal topology. Interfaces can be seen as objects in different categories and there are many interesting monads,
comonads, adjoint situations and equivalences. In the author’s paper [33] the notion of interfaces is generalized and
simpliﬁed. With this simpliﬁed notion the relationship of interfaces to games becomes apparent. Stateless networks
like the Internet are a natural application area for this simpliﬁed notion. As shown by Hancock/Hyvernat [15] interfaces
(interaction structures) seen as predicate transformers give a connection to formal topology [40]. In fact every interface
gives a natural example for a non-distributive topology. This gives as well a (until now rather vague) interpretation of
safety and liveness properties of programs [25]. In [23,24] Hyvernat uses interfaces to give a model of linear logic.
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